On paper, Trinidad and Tobago might seem to be a natural destination for Venezuelan migrants. The southernmost island in the Caribbean, Trinidad is only seven miles (11 kilometers) off the northern coast of Venezuela, and on a clear day it is possible to see the Venezuelan coastline from the fishing village Icacos, in south Trinidad. As Venezuela created the largest migration crisis in the Western Hemisphere over the last decade, with 7.9 million Venezuelans fleeing political and economic crisis since 2015, this close proximity resulted in the arrival of thousands of Venezuelans to Trinidad and Tobago.

The reality for these Venezuelans has been complicated. Many have faced restrictions and social stigma in Trinidad and Tobago, a twin-island country of just 1.5 million people. The country has not crafted a comprehensive policy for immigrant settlement and, importantly, Trinidad and Tobago does not offer legal refugee or asylum status. This situation has resulted in a growing irregular migrant population of Venezuelans, with social, economic, political, and legal implications.

While the country has adopted an enforcement-first approach, carrying out some deportations and threatening many more, immigration enforcement has been inconsistent, which has fed into public sentiment that the government is tolerant of the influx. There also is the view that the country’s borders are porous, which contributes to this opinion.

Some of these challenges have become more acute as the United States has escalated hostilities toward Venezuela in recent months. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has aligned itself with the Trump administration on some issues and U.S. warships have docked in the waters of Trinidad and Tobago. Other countries in the region have voiced opposition and concern. During this period, Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago have found themselves caught in the midst of a larger geopolitical standoff, facing intense scrutiny and demands that they leave voluntarily or by force.

This article offers insight into the experiences of Venezuelan migrants in Trinidad and Tobago and the country’s response to this migration.

A Short but Difficult Journey

The number of Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago is not fully known, and estimates range from approximately 30,000, according to the UN-led Regional Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V), to perhaps more than 200,000. This uncertainty is rooted in the fact that many Venezuelans arrived without authorization after traveling by sea. Trinidad and Tobago’s maritime borders are largely unregulated and unguarded, and many of the sea routes are channels for irregular migration and unregulated trade.

Despite the short distance, the journey can be treacherous, with many migrants arriving in overloaded and unsafe vessels. Trinidad and Tobago authorities also have been accused of lacking protocols to ensure individuals’ safety, and in some cases outright endangering it. In 2022, the Coast Guard opened fire on a boat carrying Venezuelan migrants, killing 9-month-old Yaelvis Santoyo Sarabia. Trinidad and Tobago officials said the boat was trying to ram the Coast Guard and that the shooting had been in self-defense. While the episode may not have been repeated, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said in June 2025 that she would “seek advice on protections for our coast guard to use deadly force on any unidentified vessel entering [Trinidad and Tobago] waters from Venezuela.” As such, vessels carrying Venezuelans seeking protection stand to be affected.

Troubles with Integration

Once in Trinidad and Tobago, many Venezuelans face challenges securing the basics of daily life such as education, employment, food, health care, and housing. In 2024, Venezuelan children became eligible to enroll in public schools. As of August 2024, there were 6,000 school-aged Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago, but only 60 were deemed to have met the admissions criteria, which included having an English-translated birth certificate and immunization records. And just 23 were enrolled. Many also faced barriers such as financial resources and being far from schools.

Another issue facing Venezuelan migrants is access to employment. Although work authorization is available to those who registered with the government during a brief period in 2019, just a little more than 16,500 did so, leaving the majority without access to formal employment. In November 2025, the Ministry of Homeland Security cut the number of work permits from 4,275 granted in 2024 to 757. Researchers have found that this has contributed to a high prevalence of severe food insecurity among Venezuelan residents.

Within public health care, national policy relegates Venezuelan migrants to being able to access only services for medical emergencies, primary maternal and child health care, and population and public health services such as immunization. Finally, high costs of rent, substandard housing conditions, and discrimination further color migrant experiences.

Demographic Characteristics

Venezuelans had lived in Trinidad and Tobago for years before the recent crisis, and as numbers have grown over time this population has evolved in terms of economic and educational backgrounds. Prior to 2015, most Venezuelan immigrants in the country were economically stable and highly skilled. Many came to improve their proficiency in English (the official language of Trinidad and Tobago) and acquire transferable qualifications to facilitate onward migration to North America. However, recent Venezuelan migrants have tended to be financially disadvantaged and have significantly lower educational attainment. A growing number of Indigenous Warao people have also come from Venezuela. The Warao people often lack access to necessities such as food and clean water, have limited access to education, are at elevated risk of contracting several diseases, and have high mortality rates.

Venezuelan immigrants tend to stand out in comparison to the native-born Trinbagonian population. For one, they are unlikely to speak English. They are also overwhelmingly Catholic, while a significant portion of Trinidad and Tobago identifies as belonging to other Christian denominations or religions such as Hinduism and Islam. They also tend to be ethnically and culturally distinct from Trinbagonians, who are largely of East Indian and African descent.

Fast-Moving Geopolitical Changes  

While a marked increase in movement from Venezuela to Trinidad and Tobago has been constant since 2016, the emerging conflict between the United States and Venezuela has heightened the situation. Despite the traditional neutrality of the regional Caribbean Community (CARICOM) bloc, Trinidad and Tobago has aligned itself with the United States. U.S. military aircraft and warships have been in Trinidad and Tobago and the government approved the installation of a U.S. military radar facility on the island of Tobago. In October 2025, the Venezuelan parliament declared Persad-Bissessar persona non grata. Venezuela has also suspended an energy agreement with Trinidad and Tobago and raised the prospect of retaliation.

The developing conflict has put Venezuelans in a position of further precarity, both in Venezuela and in Trinidad and Tobago. The government of Trinidad and Tobago has issued more threatening statements, including admonitions for migrants to leave. At least 200 Venezuelans lacking legal status were deported in October 2025, and the government said it was considering “a mass deportation exercise” of Venezuelans charged with crimes. Pursuant to Trinidad and Tobago law, anyone who enters the country without authorization or is irregularly present can be criminally prosecuted.

Venezuelans in Trinidad and Tobago are, therefore, at a juncture. In addition to the challenges they were already navigating—such as difficulties accessing justice, employment, housing, education, health care, and food—quickly evolving geopolitical events have resulted in an even more uncertain reality.

Legal Framework for Venezuelans

Trinidad and Tobago’s legal landscape reflects a duality between national immigration policies and domestic laws, on the one hand, and international legal obligations on the other. The only national migration law is the Immigration Act, which does not recognize asylum seekers or refugees and criminalizes all persons who enter irregularly. The law also does not recognize refugees’ international rights of nonrefoulement (not to be returned to one’s country of origin), non-penalization (not to be criminally charged for entering a country irregularly), and non-discrimination (not to be treated differently from other persons in society), which are fundamental to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol that Trinidad and Tobago ratified but did not incorporate. As a result, instances of Venezuelan migrants who meet the international refugee standard and have been deported, separated from family members, or criminally charged for entering irregularly would seem to constitute breaches of the Refugee Convention framework.  

The government’s ability to continue this approach was confirmed in the 2023 case Dominguez v Minister of National Security, in which a judge decreed there is no national legal requirement to comply with the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the government could deport even recognized refugees. International advocates including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed concern about the ruling, appealing to parliament to incorporate the convention into domestic law.

Historical Evolution

Successive leaders of Trinidad and Tobago have adopted inconsistent political positions toward Venezuelan migrants. Over the years, national policy has vacillated between intolerance of migrants, selective registration and facilitation of their employment, and deportation, with occasional assertions by the government that a formal migration policy was in the works.

In 2016, the government developed a policy designed to address the influx of Venezuelans, with a view to guiding state agents on how to treat migrants and providing a framework for access to employment and public services such as education and health care. However, it was never implemented. Later, for a two-week period in 2019, the government implemented a framework to register Venezuelan migrants and offer them temporary legal residence and right to work, regardless of how they entered. Slightly more than 16,500 Venezuelans registered. There were complaints that the registration window was too short and fears among migrants that providing information to the government could harm them and their family members.

These policies operated alongside the Immigration Act. The result was that Venezuelan migrants who did not register in 2019 or who arrived after the registration window closed did not benefit from the advantages of registration, such as the right to work or remain in Trinidad and Tobago. Instead, the unregistered majority fall subject to the Immigration Act, which does not recognize asylum seekers or refugees. This means that some Venezuelans have been allowed to work and were able to integrate, whereas the unregistered are susceptible to deportation.

With many Venezuelans lacking authorization to live in the country and their access to lawful employment, health care, and education not guaranteed, many have turned to nonprofits and other organizations for support.

Local Attitudes

Seemingly emboldened by the lack of a robust national framework and the government’s unwelcoming attitude toward new arrivals, the general public has expressed noted anti-immigrant sentiment toward Venezuelans. Seventy percent of Venezuelan migrants said they had been discriminated against based on their nationality, according to a 2023 International Organization for Migration (IOM) survey. The geopolitical tensions that have risen since then have provided a space ripe for discrimination and the imbuing of fear among an already marginalized population.

The lack of an official, implemented migration policy for handling Venezuelan arrivals, coupled with comments by government representatives, suggests an unwelcoming stance. While there is a dearth of publicly available evidence to substantiate the link between criminality and the migrant population in Trinidad and Tobago, then Attorney General Faris Al-Rawi stated in 2019 that it was “a fact… that we have had a serious uptick in certain types of crime as a result of immigrant issues.” In 2024, while Persad-Bissessar was opposition leader, she stated, “If the Venezuelan migrant community do not get their act in order and desist from engaging in criminal conduct, begin assisting the [police] in identifying Venezuelan criminals, and integrate peacefully into our society, my incoming government will take aggressive action against all illegal Venezuelan migrants and deport every one of them to their homeland by any means necessary.”

Research suggests that the public response has been split. For instance, surveys in 2018 and 2019 found that 70 percent of respondents expressed a neutral view on Venezuelan immigration, 21 percent were in favor, and 9 percent were opposed. Other researchers have noted that attitudes toward Venezuelan migrants range from welcoming to hostile, with the average being tolerant or sympathetic. Individuals in this category understand the plight of Venezuelans but think there should be a limit to the number allowed to enter. In essence, they demand a balanced response. Meanwhile, those who welcome Venezuelan migrants have tended to accept their presence, support their full integration in society, and see the potential economic and social opportunity they present.

Finally, xenophobic attitudes and hostility are found among people who oppose the presence of Venezuelan migrants. This opposition is often multidimensional, in part grounded in existing challenges affecting Trinbagonians, such as accessing housing, health care, education, and employment. Critics often see migrants as compounding pre-existing hardships and view Venezuelans as a direct threat to their livelihoods and well-being. Research by Shiva Mohan described societal responses toward Venezuelans as rooted in discrimination, exclusion, and antipathy, while Nathan Chapman concluded individuals favoring Venezuelans’ departure were rooted in the perception that the migrants are associated with criminal activities and the government should prioritize the needs of Trinbagonians.  

Additionally, there is widespread sentiment that Venezuelans ought to fully assimilate (rather than integrate) into Trinbagonian society. This feeling often arises in discussions about language as a barrier between the groups, since only a small percentage of Trinbagonians speak both English and Spanish. There is a pervasive sentiment that Venezuelans ought to communicate in English. Another factor stems from racial and ethnic differences. The difference in physical appearance often combines with a sexualization of Latin American women, contributing to the belief that they are more attractive and that Venezuelan women are trying to “take” or “steal” the partners of native women.

The Media and Nongovernmental Organizations

Media representations of Venezuelan migrants are largely negative. Many news organizations use pejorative terms such as “Vene” or “Spanish,” and many pieces link Venezuelans to high crime rates.

On the other hand, much of the support rendered to the Venezuelan community comes from community-based organizations, which generally present a more positive, compassionate picture. These groups often work in conjunction with international human-rights agencies to support Venezuelans. For example, registration of Venezuelan migrants was conducted by UNHCR, working with local organizations such as Living Water Community and the Caribbean Centre for Human Rights. These organizations—together with groups such as Caribbean Kids and Families Therapy Organisation, La Casita Hispanic Cultural Centre, and La Romaine Migrant Support—help Venezuelans access services including legal advice.

Resource Challenges for Small Islands

As a small island developing state, Trinidad and Tobago operates in an especially vulnerable place. With global warming, extreme hurricanes are becoming more frequent and sea levels are rising. Trinidad and Tobago faces challenges including coastal erosion. Vulnerable communities that depend on the environment for farming, food, and potable water have been particularly negatively impacted.

The country also has a tight labor market and limited available resources. In 2024, its gross domestic product (GDP) was $26.4 billion, which was one of the highest in the Caribbean, and especially notable for its small size (the per capita GDP of $19,300 was similar to that of Costa Rica and Panama). Yet this sizable economy depends in large part on oil and natural gas, supplies of which are dwindling. Further, since 2008, the country’s real comprehensive wealth per capita has declined, signaling “an unsustainable trend in well-being for the country,” according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Finally, a reported 20 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and there are significant wealth disparities.

As such, the economic foundation upon which Venezuelan migrants seek to build their lives is uncertain. There is heavy competition between Trinbagonians and migrants for employment, access to housing, public health-care facilities, and education.

Lack of Protections in a Complicated Environment

Trinidad and Tobago’s geographic, political, economic, and social landscape may at first blush appear to make it an ideal destination for Venezuelans seeking to escape their country’s economic and political challenges. However, there have been demonstrated challenges that have reduced the appeal. The lack of legal protections pervades every aspect of Venezuelans’ lived experiences in the country, and the government’s alignment with the U.S. administration complicates their future.

Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago’s economy and small size present unique challenges to a more inclusive approach, despite the geopolitical similarities to countries across the Caribbean. These challenges are exacerbated by its small island developing status and attendant finite resources. The pressure placed on socioeconomic infrastructure by an increasing migrant population has forced the government to confront real consequences. While the conflicting national landscape of policy and law continues to obfuscate the official response, the Venezuelan population in Trinidad and Tobago remains exceedingly vulnerable. If urgent action is not taken by the government, the situation could turn into a much more complicated human-rights crisis.

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