As part of its strategy to carry out 1 million deportations a year, the Trump administration has embarked on an ambitious campaign, unmatched in U.S. history, to encourage individuals to “self-deport.” The effort is perhaps at least in part a tacit acknowledgment that the administration’s numerical target might be impossible through immigration enforcement alone, no matter how muscular. While a somewhat similar U.S. attempt in 2008 to encourage departures was considered a failure, administration officials apparently believe they can reverse that record through a potent combination of carrots and sticks. “If you are here illegally, self-deportation is the best, safest, and most cost-effective way to leave the United States to avoid arrest,” Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem stated in May.

The self-deportation enterprise is supported by a $200 million international ad campaign pledging government-provided travel and a payment of $1,000 per person departing the United States voluntarily, or else steep fines and additional penalties including arrest and detention for those who remain.

For people contemplating the choice, the current backdrop may be more of a deciding factor than the specific elements of the self-deportation policy. Increasingly high-profile arrests of removable noncitizens not just at workplaces and homes, but also during court hearings, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) check-ins, and even citizenship interviews have generated intense nervousness. Poor conditions in detention facilities and the threat of removal to a third country, as seen with removal flights to El Salvador, have engendered a palpable fear of arrest. Additionally, the imminent end of some public benefits for unauthorized immigrants’ U.S.-citizen family members and the sharing of tax filing and other personal information have generated a new level of anxiety.

Noem and other administration officials have also said that self-deportees “may still have the opportunity to return legally in the future and live the American dream,” which may seem to offer a new immigration pathway or access to a visa. How the administration could accomplish this is unclear, given most unauthorized immigrants are barred from re-entry for multiple years and it is the absence of sufficient legal pathways in the first place that has prompted many to enter illegally or overstay a visa.

For the administration, self-deportation is an attractive proposition. It is far less expensive than forcible repatriations, which average more than $17,100 per individual, according to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To defray the cost of its self-deportation incentives, the administration is repurposing State Department funds allocated for refugee aid.

In part because of the self-directed nature of voluntary departure, data on the number of people who have self-deported so far are thin or anecdotal.

A similar past experiment in the United States in 2008 was highly unsuccessful; just eight people out of the 457,000 who were eligible opted in. Comparable efforts in other high-income countries have also struggled to encourage voluntary returns on the scale the Trump administration seeks.

This article outlines the Trump administration’s policies encouraging self-deportation, the factors that may determine whether individuals participate, and the prior experiences of the United States and other countries.

Building a Self-Deportation Enterprise

The administration began unveiling its self-deportation campaign in March by repurposing a mobile app previously known as CBP One, which the Biden administration had used to allow asylum seekers and other migrants to schedule appointments to be screened at an official port of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. Renamed CBP Home, the app allows individuals to register for voluntary departure and then confirm exit from the country. More than 5,000 people had logged their return through CBP Home as of April 9, according to Fox News. The app rebrand was followed by a May 5 announcement of a $1,000 “exit bonus” paid once return has been verified, though details on how this payment is delivered remain scarce.

CBP Home is just one facet of the larger self-deportation enterprise. A May 9 presidential proclamation establishing Project Homecoming instructs the secretaries of Homeland Security and State to create “seamless processes” for unauthorized immigrants to depart the country, including technology such as CBP Home, a “concierge service” to coordinate airline tickets (paid for by the U.S. government), financial incentives for voluntary departure, and a national communications campaign on the incentives and disincentives of self-deportation. On May 19, DHS conducted the first government-charted voluntary repatriation flight, carrying 64 individuals back to Honduras and Colombia.

A System of Incentives and Disincentives

To sway individuals, the administration is pairing a range of incentives to depart with penalties for staying. Incentives for registering through CBP Home include deprioritization for arrest and removal while individuals make final arrangements, the government’s promise to cover the cost of travel, and the $1,000 check upon return.

One particular incentive offered in the DHS messaging, however, remains unproven and unclear how it could be fulfilled: that use of CBP Home will allow individuals to “preserve your opportunity to potentially return [to the United States] the legal, right way.” In reality, the ability to lawfully return is highly case-specific. For example, those who were unlawfully present for more than 180 days but less than a year in the United States are subject to a three-year bar on re-entry; those who were unlawfully present for more than one year face a ten-year bar on re-entry. Attempting to enter the United States while subject to either bar could result in a permanent ban on re-entry. These bars apply even to people who leave voluntarily.

Additionally, abandoning an ongoing deportation case in immigration court without being granted voluntary departure by an immigration judge could result in the issuance of a removal order and a bar on re-entry for a certain period of time, depending on the individual’s circumstances. Likewise, abandoning an application for an immigration benefit such as asylum at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) could have detrimental implications for future immigration applications.

Finally, the pledge of a possible future legal return ignores the reality that caused so many people to enter without authorization or overstay a temporary visa in the first place: Pathways to a green card are often very narrow, especially for those in low-skilled occupations. Unless Congress makes changes to the legal immigration system, which it has not done since 1990, self-deportees might not have any available legal channels to return.

There are clear disincentives for choosing to stay: possible arrest, detention and deportation, fines, and confiscation of bank accounts, homes, vehicles, and other personal property. As of late May, authorities had reportedly imposed nearly $2 billion in fines on more than 7,000 people, fining individuals $1,000 per day they remained in the country without authorization. On June 9, the administration announced that those who opt to self-deport will have fines forgiven.

Beyond these concrete disincentives, there is the growing inhospitable environment for unauthorized immigrants—both in the heightened enforcement actions and threats to public benefits. While unauthorized immigrants can access relatively few federally funded benefits, their U.S.-citizen family members may be eligible for a range of supports for housing, health care, and other assistance that are now being reduced or slashed at the state and federal level. Over the long term, this could have severe impacts, including for U.S.-born children in mixed-status families. For example, California Governor Gavin Newsom has proposed rolling back health-care benefits for unauthorized immigrants, a budgeting move he blames on fiscal impacts of federal tariffs. Additionally, the sharing of tax data and other information with law enforcement agencies creates a chilling effect. Over time, immigrants of all legal statuses may also be less likely to partake in public benefits as a growing amount of personal data is shared with federal immigration authorities.

More potently, high-profile arrests have led to greater fear in immigrant communities. The temperature has risen, as demonstrated by recent ICE operations in Los Angeles that led to large protests and President Donald Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and U.S. Marines. This marked the first time since 1965 that a president has deployed the National Guard against a governor’s wishes.

ICE arrests under Trump have dramatically increased. According to ICE, there were an average of 2,000 arrests per day in the first week of June, which compares to just over 300 arrests per day in fiscal year (FY) 2024 under the Biden administration. Similarly, the number of people in detention has also increased. As of May 31, ICE average daily detention exceeded 50,000, the highest level since 2019. Conditions in detention have reportedly deteriorated, with overcrowding leading to health concerns. Conditions in the Delaney Hall detention facility in Newark, New Jersey prompted unrest and four detainees escaped last week (three had been caught and returned to detention as of this writing).

Although removals have not yet reached the levels needed to put the administration on pace to meet its ambitious target of 1 million deportations annually, the high-profile campaigns and use of the military have pierced the public consciousness. The administration has furthered this publicity with a messaging campaign showing deportees in chains sent to places other than their countries of origin, including El Salvador’s notorious mega-prison CECOT. The U.S. government has struck arrangements with Panama, Costa Rica, and more recently Kosovo, and has sought to deport migrants to Libya and South Sudan, though the latter arrangements have been halted by U.S. judges.

Support from Origin Countries

After arrival, returnees need to be able to reintegrate, and government support in origin countries can be a factor in the decision whether to leave the United States voluntarily. In Mexico and Central America, reintegration programming has historically focused on immediate needs, including securing proper documentation and offering monetary vouchers for basic expenses.

There are efforts to ensure more long-term success, including job training centers to help with economic integration. For instance, Mexico’s “Mexico Embraces You” strategy and Honduras’s “Come Home Brother” program offer returnees supports to find a job or start a business, as well as $100 upon arrival. Still, many programs do not address the psychosocial needs that returnees often face, including mental health struggles or the inability to find a job matching their skills acquired abroad. Reintegration programs also appear to be more aligned to meet the needs of returnees with short periods of U.S. residence, not those who may have lived in the United States for many years.

Repurposing Foreign Assistance

To operationalize its effort, the administration is restructuring the State Department to create a self-deportation assistance infrastructure. Invoking the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (MRA) of 1962, the State Department determined in May that assistance for voluntary returns will contribute to U.S. foreign policy interests, thus authorizing the repurposing of funds traditionally reserved for assisting refugees, including via the resettlement system which has been indefinitely suspended for most refugees. Since that determination, the administration has shifted $250 million in MRA funds to pay for self-deportees’ flights and the $1,000 exit bonus.

Part of the State Department overhaul includes re-engineering the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and establishing an Office of Remigration. Rather than focusing on resettlement, as was part of PRM’s mandate, the new office will track repatriations and facilitate voluntary returns. Though a relatively new term in the United States, “remigration” is a buzzword among the far right in Europe to describe the desired expulsion, forcibly or via pressure campaign, of non-ethnically European immigrants and their descendants.

Voluntary Returns from the United States Are Historically Unassisted

Truly voluntary return is a common feature of the U.S. immigration system, as immigrants opt to return to their countries of origin or migrate elsewhere for a variety of reasons. However, coordinated attempts to incentivize and facilitate assisted returns have found little success.

The most direct example in recent times was in 2008, when the Bush administration launched the Scheduled Departure pilot program for individuals with final orders of removal who remained in the country. The pilot, which ran for three weeks that August, was abandoned after only eight individuals took up the offer, out of the 457,000 estimated to be eligible. Critics noted that the program lacked real incentives for participation, however, so it is an imperfect comparison for the present effort.

In previous eras, large numbers of immigrants departed voluntarily amid deportation efforts, particularly Mexicans (who have accounted for most unauthorized immigrants historically). During the Great Depression, for example, the government began a Mexican repatriation program amid concerns Mexican immigrants held jobs in which U.S. citizens could be employed. While very few records of these repatriations exist, an estimated 400,000 to 1 million Mexicans left the country during that time, likely of their own volition but motivated by the fear of formal removal. Over time, some local aid groups even began to organize financial and travel assistance for returning Mexicans. A similar course of events occurred in 1954, when the government launched Operation Wetback. An ad campaign in the weeks leading up to the launch seemingly motivated thousands to depart even before the operation began.

In other chapters of U.S. history, unauthorized immigrants have returned to their countries of origin truly voluntarily and not driven by fear or threat of government action. For example, the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants declined by about 2.5 million from 2007 to 2021, according to Migration Policy Institute (MPI) estimates. Some of this decline can be attributed to voluntary returns, as Mexico’s economic conditions improved. The halt to that decline and slight growth in the Mexican unauthorized population since 2021 has been partly driven by the stronger U.S. economic recovery post-pandemic.

The period often cited as the biggest era of return migration occurred between 1900 and 1920, when an estimated half of all Italians who had arrived in the late 1800s returned to Italy. There were myriad reasons for this movement. Many Italians immigrated amid economic turmoil in Southern Italy and were lured by booming U.S. industrialization, then returned once the Italian economy had stabilized and they had saved money and developed new skills in the United States.

Pay-to-Go Policies in Other Countries Have Mixed Results

Though new to the United States, policies paying noncitizens to voluntary depart have a long history in many parts of the world—with varying degrees of success. Studies have shown that most programs do not live up to policymakers’ expectations, with far fewer people opting to depart than anticipated.

Researchers point to a number of factors that determine the success or failure of pay-to-go programs, including the amount of money offered, the conditions in host and origin countries alike, and the presence of available reintegration supports in the origin country.

In Sweden for example, the government is seeking to increase voluntary departures of some noncitizens with a Swedish residence permit including refugees and other protected individuals, and is thus raising the pay-to-go financial incentive from $1,000 per adult ($4,000 per family) to $36,000 per adult, with a cap of $62,000 per family. Under the lower monetary structure, in 2023, just 70 applications were filed for the payment and only one was approved. Even with the larger offer, government researchers predict the number of voluntary returns may increase by only about 700. Notably, Sweden’s pay-to-go offer is not available to individuals who have received an expulsion order.

Pay-to-go programs for legally and unlawfully present noncitizens seen after the 2008-09 recession, including in the Czech Republic, Japan, and Spain, had varying levels of success. None saw voluntary returns at the scale hoped for by Trump administration officials.

Other initiatives have seen better results. For example, in 2016 Pakistan in conjunction with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) doubled the average return assistance for Afghans from $200 to $400, resulting in more than 500,000 Afghans returning to Afghanistan. However, the increased assistance came amidst two critical events making Pakistan less hospitable: tensions following the December 2014 massacre at a school in Peshawar allegedly carried out by Afghans and other foreign nationals, and the government’s threat to let refugee cards expire, which would have taken away access to critical assistance. Alongside these more hostile conditions, the increased monetary incentive resulted in a higher number of returnees.

Can the Trump Administration Design the Right Formula?

Other countries’ experiences suggest monetary incentives alone will not tilt the balance in favor of voluntary departure; additional push factors are often necessary. Leaving becomes worthwhile only when staying becomes undesirable or unbearable.

Certainly, the Trump administration’s high-profile arrests and deportations and efforts to roll back or end public benefits are creating a potent mix to provide this push encouraging individuals to self-deport. It remains to be seen, though, if the pressures entice a meaningful number of individuals to leave on their own. Poor conditions in origin countries and the risk of leaving family members, homes, and jobs, as well as losing the ability to send remittances, may keep people in place—in particular for those who are deeply integrated in U.S. communities. Sixty-two percent of the unauthorized population had at least a decade of U.S. residence as of 2019, MPI estimated.

Incentives and disincentives for self-deportation remain fluid. If courts or public pressure force the administration to scale back its enforcement operations, the element of fear may dissipate, weakening the push to return. Alternately, if Congress creates new legal immigration pathways or eases restrictions for re-entry to voluntarily departing unauthorized immigrants, larger numbers may opt to leave.

In any case, the Trump administration is in the beginning stages of a potentially grand experiment in immigration enforcement with its self-deportation initiative. Its success or failure could have ramifications for years of policymaking to come.

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